The growing influence of US asset managers in the Netherlands

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Written by: Rodrigo Fernandez

Written by: Boris Schellekens

Published on: 26 August 2025

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In 2005 and 2006, the asset managers involved in Dutch companies were predominantly Dutch. By the end of 2024, American asset managers had become more dominant. The four largest American players now collectively control 11.8 per cent of the Amsterdam stock market capitalisation, more than ten times as much as the five largest Dutch asset managers, which together represent only 0.9 per cent.

This change has had important consequences. Asset managers may not own the capital they manage, but as stewards of billions of dollars, they have significant influence. For example, they vote on shareholder resolutions, and as major players, their votes have a real impact.

US asset managers appear to vote differently compared to the Dutch asset managers on important issues like climate change. ShareAction (opens in new window) has mapped voting behaviour in relation to 279 climate resolutions in the US and Canada. In only 0 to 13 per cent of cases did the four American asset managers vote in favour. Dutch asset managers, on the other hand, voted in favour by a large majority.

Asset managers vote on behalf of clients in many cases. Options for clients to vote themselves are limited. For example, since 2022, BlackRock has offered “passthrough voting” (enabling clients to vote directly), but this option is not available to all clients, and not all clients who can use it do so. To give a sense of the scale of the issue, BlackRock manages assets valued at approximately $6.2 trillion, but only owners of only 10 per cent of these assets vote directly. This means that for the remaining 90 per cent of the total portfolio of assets, for which BlackRock has delegated voting power, BlackRock votes using its own guidelines. While its guidelines differ for European countries, the differences do not appear to affect voting on climate issues. SOMO spoke to BlackRock, and the company emphasised its engagement with clients(opens in new window) on sustainability issues. However, voting is, in our view, a more concrete measure of a company’s approach to climate, and the contrast between US and Dutch asset managers’ voting patterns speaks for itself.

Vanguard, another of the big four, only launched a limited pilot program for direct voting by clients in 2025, applying to only 8 of its 91 funds (Vanguard; 2025(opens in new window) , StockAnalysis; 2025 (opens in new window) ). For the vast majority of investors, mostly small private investors who are not actively involved in voting rights, this means that American asset managers automatically vote on their behalf. This “silent mass” of default voters, thus, unintentionally strengthens American influence on Dutch businesses.

The role of Dutch Pension Funds

The growing role of US asset managers in Dutch companies raises questions, including for Dutch pension funds. Pension funds like ABP and PFZW manage part of their assets through Dutch asset managers, APG and PGGM, but also outsource billions to the four largest American asset managers. Formally, pension funds retain their voting rights, and it is likely that they regularly exercise them independently. However, the impact of this is limited because the American parties manage much larger equity stakes and have a greater influence over the strategic direction of companies in which they are a shareholder, acting on behalf of their clients.

Pension funds that manage hundreds of billions on behalf of millions of Dutch citizens have the responsibility not only to promise sustainability but also to actually enforce it. This makes true stewardship possible again: active, substantive involvement in the strategic direction of companies, instead of passively following stock indices.

This may sound like a pipe dream, but in reality it is a return to a model that functioned for decades. In the post-war decades, pension funds like ABP managed their capital with a clear public mission. They directly financed housing construction, infrastructure, and state-owned enterprises through private loans. Until 1976, ABP even held the entire Dutch national debt(opens in new window) , demonstrating how capital was used in a targeted manner at the time to finance public goals. This strategic concentration of capital made public ambitions possible, from public affairs like the Delta Works and the financing of housing associations to (state-owned) enterprises like the PTT.

From the late 1980s onward, this orientation fundamentally changed. In 1988, ABP definitively broke its exclusive focus on the Dutch economy. For the first time, investments were made in foreign equities, with direct allocations to Tokyo and New York. International diversification became the norm, and from 2000 onward, a growing portion of the sector outsourced its asset management. This gradually led to the disappearance of direct control over investment choices, driven by market liberalisation and the internationalisation of capital markets.

The role of asset managers and the way pension funds operate raise broader issues for the Netherlands. After all, whoever manages asset allocation largely determines the direction of the economy, industry, and climate policy. This data analysis and wider work published today in ESB will, we hope, trigger a public conversation on how we can ensure that those who make decisions that significantly impact climate and sustainability serve, and do not frustrate, the public interest.

Note: This article is a summary of the research conducted by SOMO and published in the ESB journal. Please find the full article in Dutch here.(opens in new window)