Kenya: the human cost of Big Tech’s power

The Kenyan government has made a big bet on the country becoming the tech hub of Africa. Often marketed as Silicon Savannah(opens in new window) , the delivery of tech jobs is a central plank of the government’s strategy. And, at first, all seemed well. When big multinational platforms entered Kenya, they rode a wave of political enthusiasm for innovation and digital transformation. But as the platforms expanded, the honeymoon was quickly over. The promise of the gig economy and data work collided head-on with the reality of Big Tech’s business model and its ability to aggressively push Kenya to adapt itself to its business needs. Workers were caught in the middle.

Driving a hard bargain

Uber and Bolt dominate Kenya’s ride-hailing market(opens in new window) . When Uber(opens in new window) entered Kenya in 2015 and Bolt(opens in new window) (then Taxify) in 2016, the companies operated in a regulatory grey area. Drivers(opens in new window) were excluded from labour law protections, designed for formal employment rather than gig work, while companies were able to operate without registering(opens in new window) as providers of public service vehicles with the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA). Within this regulatory vacuum, platform companies unilaterally altered the terms under which drivers worked.

As competition from alternative ride-hailing companies increased in 2016, Uber slashed(opens in new window) prices for rides by 35 per cent. While prices for consumers were cut, the company kept the 25 per cent commission fee(opens in new window) it charged drivers. This put pressure on drivers(opens in new window) , and for many, it meant they couldn’t repay the loans they had taken out to buy their vehicles. In July 2019, following the breakdown of an agreement with the ride-hailing companies to improve compensation, drivers started a wave of strikes.(opens in new window) They demanded higher pay and lower commissions. It was then that the NTSA first proposed(opens in new window) regulation for this market.

Little did they know what they were up against. A global media investigation(opens in new window) later revealed the extent of Uber’s aggressive lobbying as it pursued its “ruthless expansion” and “barged its way into new markets”. In Kenya, Uber led the corporate pushback against regulation, coordinating with a competitor and even taking regulators to the courts.

Copies of lobby letters published by the Kenyan Parliament show that a cap on the percentage commission the companies could charge drivers was the flashpoint. Uber(opens in new window) charged drivers 25 per cent, and Bolt(opens in new window) charged 20 per cent. The NTSA(opens in new window) draft proposed capping the commission at 15 per cent. Uber(opens in new window) called the proposal “the most prohibitive in the world”.

Uber joined forces with Bolt to push back on the cap, despite the two being business rivals. Echoing a familiar refrain from Big Tech, the two ride-hailing platforms argued(opens in new window) (page 79) that the cap would undermine Kenya’s broader tech sector by deterring foreign investment and eliminating “tens of thousands of economic opportunities”. This framing turned an issue of fair compensation for drivers into an existential economic threat. It is a lobbying narrative Big Tech has perfected and used globally: regulation that harms the Big Tech business model means big economic losses for the country.

While the companies ultimately failed to eliminate the cap, their lobbying did succeed in raising it. When the regulations(opens in new window) were finalised in 2022, the commission ceiling was set at 18 per cent rather than the original 15 per cent.

More than one way to get your way

This was not the end for Uber, though. After the regulations were adopted, the company filed(opens in new window) a petition in the Supreme Court of Kenya seeking to block their implementation. TechCrunch(opens in new window) , an online media outlet focused on the tech sector, reported on court documents showing that Uber argued that the new regulations were unconstitutional, stifled innovation, and would slow foreign investment in Kenya.

Drivers responded to Uber’s efforts to block the cap on commissions with a strike(opens in new window) . The case was quietly withdrawn soon after. At that time, Uber’s spokesperson stated that once the company received its transport network licence from the NTSA, it decided that complying with the law and lowering its commission from 25 to 18 per cent was the “best course of action.”

That may be what Uber said, but according to drivers, it is not what they did. In November 2025, the Transport Workers Union of Kenya notified(opens in new window) Uber (and Bolt) of its plans to sue them for allegedly charging drivers more than the mandated 18 per cent commission, amongst other things.

Uber’s conduct in Kenya is far from an isolated example of the company’s approach. Efforts to prevent a cap on commissions are consistent with information contained in the Uber Files(opens in new window) . A tranche of thousands of internal documents leaked by an Uber whistleblower, and made public in 2022, revealed how, in aggressive pursuit of its business agenda, Uber had, among other things, “flouted the law” and “secretly lobbied governments across the world”. Responding to the leak, Uber representatives promised(opens in new window) the company had changed since 2017. Uber’s actions in Kenya call that change into question.

While ride-hailing companies successfully watered down the commission cap, their impact was moderated by the fact that drivers organised themselves and demanded changes in Kenya. But what happens when a Big Tech company hires workers with less public visibility? The case of Meta in Kenya exposes a much deeper level of corporate power.

Outsourcing responsibility

Big Tech firms like Meta quickly took note of Kenya’s ambitions to become a regional tech hub and began recruiting workers in the country to perform content moderation and data annotation. The company does not directly employ these workers. Instead, the work is routed through business process outsourcing (BPO) (opens in new window) and crowdwork platforms(opens in new window) ,(opens in new window) intermediary companies that provide services on a contract basis. Research by civil society groups and legal cases led by workers have exposed how data work, especially content moderation, can be highly traumatic(opens in new window) and exploitative(opens in new window) . Workers in Kenya have started organising(opens in new window) against the working conditions they experienced, including being exposed(opens in new window) to psychological trauma, unfair dismissal, and poverty wages.

In 2022, a former content moderator sued(opens in new window) both Meta and its BPO contractor, the San Francisco-headquartered Samasource (now Sama), arguing that the company used outsourcing to distance itself from the responsibility of exploiting workers, even though Meta was directly setting the work conditions.

What followed was a drawn-out battle that blurred the boundaries of legal and political processes. Meta(opens in new window) argued that it could not be sued because it was not officially registered in Kenya, and therefore, the country’s law did not apply to it. The Kenyan courts disagreed(opens in new window) .

Hold us accountable, and we’ll take our jobs elsewhere

In January 2023, Sama and Meta ceased content moderation operations in Kenya, firing(opens in new window) over 180 workers. This led to another(opens in new window) lawsuit over unfair dismissal, and again, Meta argued(opens in new window) that it was not subject to Kenyan jurisdiction because it is a foreign company and is “not carrying on business in Kenya”. But, in a landmark September 2024 ruling, Kenya’s Court of Appeal rejected Meta’s arguments and confirmed that the company can be sued in Kenya.

Two months later, the Kenyan government put forward the Business Laws (Amendment) Bill, which, among other measures, shields Big Tech firms from lawsuits over their treatment of workers. The proposed new laws(opens in new window) mean that Business Process Outsourcing companies would be responsible for “any claim raised by an employee in relation to the contract of service and shall not, in its defence to such claim, assert that it was not in fact the beneficiary of the services of the employee.”

In other words, in the future, workers could still sue Sama but not Meta.

Public statements from the Kenyan president and the Senate majority leader, who drafted the bill, made it clear that they were acting in response to the demands of the tech industry.

In March 2024, as Meta was pushing back on workers in court, Nick Clegg, then Meta’s Head of Public Policy, joined a Kenya Independence Day celebration. At this event, President Ruto said(opens in new window) (starting minute 1:23):

“We want to thank Meta for considering Kenya for some of the BPOs that will be trying to find a home. I want to tell you that we are reworking the legislation in Kenya to make it much easier for people who work in the BPO space to be able to work with Kenyan young people.”

In November, Aaron Cheruiyot(opens in new window) , the Senate Majority Leader, publicly stated that tech companies needed the legislation to continue investing in Kenya and creating more jobs. Cheruiyot tweeted that the proposed change was a response to “the players in the BPO space. A growing sector that currently employs thousands, with the potential to explode and employ millions.” According to Cheruiyot, “industry players insist that if we are to fully realise our potential, this is their ask to us as a country”.

The president was even more explicit, speaking at a public town hall (opens in new window) the following month, in December 2024, shortly after the Business Laws (Amendment) Bill was introduced [starting at 11m27]:

“I’m told in our mid-east, we have Samasource. Are they here? [Looking around the room and spotting the representative] Right. Those people there were taken to court. And they had real trouble. They really bothered me. Now I can report to you that we have changed the law. So, nobody will take you to court again on any matter. And I’m talking about Samasource because they will tell us how many people they employ and what kind of trouble they were going through. And they were about to relocate most of their operations to Uganda because many of us were giving them trouble. And we didn’t have the correct space. Thank you very much, good people.”

A factsheet published alongside the proposed reforms explained that the changes to employment liability were intended to respond(opens in new window) to the needs of companies seeking to set up call centres or BPOs in Kenya. Although this is the framing, the Bill actually benefits companies like Meta as it prevents workers from suing them directly. Meta has (opens in new window) denied advocating for the Bill. Perhaps they never even had to – the message that they could easily take the work elsewhere was implicit and clearly conveyed by the BPOs working for them.

We talked to Mercy Mutemi, Executive Director at The Oversight Lab, which represents tech workers in legal interventions in Kenya. This includes the ongoing lawsuits mentioned earlier, as well as a constitutional petition(opens in new window) challenging the Business Laws (Amendment) Bill process as unconstitutional, on the grounds that it failed to include public participation, thereby denying affected workers a voice.

Mutemi explains that the problem with this case is “legislative capture. This is not a bill that originated from parliamentarians. It’s a bill that originated from a case that’s going on in court that made its way down to the president, the president declaring that something is going to be done, then parliament enacting it.”

Mutemi went on to note that in Kenya, there are “different ways in which legislation is influenced, including threatening to pull jobs in an economy where people are really desperate for jobs.”

The pulling of jobs is no idle threat, as the more than 180 people fired by Sama show. A media investigation found that Meta’s content moderation work had moved to Ghana(opens in new window) , where presumably Kenya’s experience serves as a cautionary tale for any workers attempting to stand up for their rights, or any government that might be inclined to enforce labour law protections.

As Mutemi put it:

“Meta’s story does communicate that if you dare to hold us accountable, we will just move. And [the Kenya case] is a proof-of-concept; governments are now scared because they have seen what Meta did in Kenya.’’

How Big Tech’s needs become law

The cases of platform and data workers in Kenya expose a central pillar of Big Tech’s global lobby playbook: threaten a country’s economy and jobs. This is a strategy that foreign investors have used for decades, but in Big Tech’s hands, the threat is at its most powerful. Technology is the dominant industry of the future, and it has become vital to the future success of many other business sectors. When a handful of companies, mostly based in the Global North, wield monopoly-like power, their needs can become internalised by governments.

Corporate lobbying reaches its zenith when the political space is so captured that politicians act for business even when there is no explicit demand. In this context, labour rights, consumer rights, and indeed all human rights, are protected only insofar as they do not interfere with the economic interests of companies, which governments now see as the same as their own interests.