EU countries are selling critical energy infrastructure to Trump-aligned fossil fuel giant Energy Transfer

Since winning a second term, President Trump has rolled out a policy agenda that, amongst other things, gives strong support to the interests of fossil fuel energy companies(opens in new window) .

This agenda is increasingly gaining influence over European policy, undermining climate and regulatory action by the EU. For example, a US oil company, ExxonMobil, recently leveraged its relationship with the Trump administration in its largely successful efforts to kill landmark EU legislation on human rights and climate change.

US investors have long had a significant influence in Europe. In 2024, the US was the top foreign investor into the EU(opens in new window) , with 30% of all mergers and acquisitions coming from the US. However, as SOMO has recently written, the risks associated with US investment aligned to the Trump administration have increased, and the EU should pay far closer attention to hostile US business influence in Europe.

However, the EU has potentially contradictory policy aims. On the one hand, the European Commission is aware of the risks that some foreign investment can pose, including risks to EU sovereignty and security, and is expanding frameworks to improve the screening of such investment. On the other hand, driven by a deep fear of economic decline(opens in new window) , stoked up by the European business lobby, the EU is also pursuing a pro-industry competitiveness agenda, in which foreign investment is seen as vital to the EU’s economic prosperity(opens in new window) .

Moreover, with the US long seen as an ally, the seismic shifts in the geopolitical landscape during 2025, and the idea that some US investment may carry significant risks for Europe, have yet to be processed by many European policymakers.

This article focuses on such an investment.

Energy Transfer, a controversial US oil and gas pipeline company with close ties to the Trump administration, is acquiring critical energy infrastructure in multiple European states. The article gives an overview of Energy Transfer and its acquisitions in Europe, and questions why regulatory authorities in multiple European countries have not done more to assess and ensure scrutiny of the risks.

Who is Energy Transfer?

Energy Transfer is a US oil and gas pipeline company, founded(opens in new window) in Texas in 1996. Since then, it has grown into one of the world’s biggest energy infrastructure and distribution companies. A key driver of Energy Transfer’s growth has been its strategy of buying up other companies(opens in new window) . Its 2012 purchase of Sunoco, a major fuel distribution company in the US, made(opens in new window) Energy Transfer “one of the largest and most diversified energy partnerships in the country”. This $5.3 billion acquisition(opens in new window) was Energy Transfer’s largest deal at the time, and enabled the company, which until then had focused on gas, to move into the oil market.

Today, Energy Transfer owns one of the largest pipeline systems for the transport of liquid petroleum and natural gas in the US. It also owns(opens in new window) several major export facilities and exports oil and gas products to countries around the world.

With record fossil fuel profits(opens in new window) in the oil and gas industry in recent years due to the energy crisis in 2021 and 2022, Energy Transfer has also seen its revenue and profits grow (see graph). Energy Transfer saw a revenue of $82.6 billion in 2024, for a net profit of $6.6 billion. It greatly rewarded its shareholders for these profits, paying out dividends of $4.6 billion in the same year (see graph).

The company’s biggest shareholder is Kelcy Warren, a co-founder, former CEO and current chairman of the board. Mr. Warren holds 8.8% of Energy Transfer’s shares, with the remainder held almost entirely by US institutional investors (see table below).

Energy Transfer has made Mr. Warren very wealthy, today ranking among the richest 500 people in the world with a net worth of $7.1 billion(opens in new window) . The graph below shows his wealth increased from $1.7 billion in 2016 to $7.1 billion in 2025.

Energy Transfer’s political connections to the Trump administration

Energy Transfer has significant political ties to the Trump administration. Both Kelcy Warren(opens in new window) and Energy Transfer(opens in new window) are key Trump donors(opens in new window) . Kelcy Warren has hosted several fundraisers and reportedly donated over $13 million(opens in new window) to Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign.

Former Republican Governor of Texas Rick Perry served on the Boards of Energy Transfer and Sunoco(opens in new window) from 2015(opens in new window) until the end of 2016(opens in new window) , before being appointed as Secretary of Energy by President Trump, a post he held from March 2017 to December 2019. In 2020, Rick Perry returned to the Board of Energy Transfer, where he remains. This move was criticised as a conflict of interest(opens in new window) by Democrat US Senator Elizabeth Warren.

Both the first and second Trump administrations have made decisions favourable to Energy Transfer, including in relation to the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline.

Energy Transfer’s troubling environmental track record

While earning billions of dollars from its oil and gas pipelines and infrastructure, Energy Transfer has racked up a deeply troubling record of environmental abuses in the United States.

Dakota Access Pipeline protests

The most well-known environmental and human rights(opens in new window) case involving Energy Transfer is the $3.7 billion(opens in new window) Dakota Access Pipeline. The Standing Rock Sioux and other Native American communities opposed its construction because of the risks it posed to the water supply and sacred cultural sites. Between 2016 and 2017, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe fought the project in court and, with other Native Nations and environmental activists, organised protest camps at the site. There were multiple reports of excessive force against protestors, including by private security forces(opens in new window) and the police(opens in new window) .

As noted above, Energy Transfer benefitted from an intervention of the Trump administration in 2017, which allowed it to move ahead with the Dakota Access Pipeline construction without a planned environmental assessment being carried out. In 2019, Energy Transfer sued Greenpeace over its alleged role in the Dakota Access Pipeline protests.

Other cases of environmental abuse

While Energy Transfer’s construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline and its response to the protests are well-known, this is far from the only case where the company has been accused of causing harm to the environment. Energy Transfer and its subsidiary, Sunoco, have been fined millions of dollars by US authorities for numerous violations of the Clean Water Act, oil spills(opens in new window) , and pollution(opens in new window) between 2013 and 2020.

In 2022, Energy Transfer was held criminally responsible for charges(opens in new window) related to the construction of a pipeline project operated by Sunoco. Overall, Energy Transfer paid over $20 million in fines(opens in new window) and assessments for over 120 violations across the 350-mile-long pipeline. In 2024, Bloomberg reported(opens in new window) that a US pipeline operated by Sunoco spilled “more refined fuels than any other [US] operator in 2024”.

Sunoco is also among several oil companies being sued by Honolulu for allegedly misleading the public(opens in new window) about the dangers of climate change. In January 2025, the US Supreme Court rejected(opens in new window) a request by the oil companies to dismiss the lawsuit.

Energy Transfer and Sunoco have both made(opens in new window) clear(opens in new window) that they see robust action to end the use of fossil fuels and promote electric vehicles as key risks for their business.

Energy Transfer comes to Europe

The picture that emerges from SOMO’s analysis of Energy Transfer’s US operations is one of a company that aggressively pursues profits and disregards the public interest, while leveraging political connections and wealth to advance its commercial operations and agenda. The company appears to have a hostile view of civil society, climate change and the protection of human rights and the environment.

This company is now – with almost no scrutiny – expanding into Europe and gaining ownership of key infrastructure.

Since 2024, Energy Transfer, through its subsidiary Sunoco, has bought up nearly €700 million worth of European energy infrastructure assets. The company is acquiring a network of liquid fuel storage facilities (mainly used for oil) in strategic locations, including Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland. These storage facilities play a critical role in the liquid fuel supply chain, enabling companies to store crude oil and other products until they are ready to be distributed to refineries and other buyers.

The goal(opens in new window) of buying liquid fuel terminals in the Netherlands and Ireland was to “create supply chain efficiencies” for Sunoco’s US East Coast operations. Both terminals are in key strategic locations for distributing (US) oil into the European market.

While it is Sunoco that acquired these assets, Energy Transfer has full managerial and operational control of this company. It appoints Sunoco’s board of directors, who have a “contractual duty”(opens in new window) to manage the company “in a manner beneficial to Energy Transfer.” To illustrate the relation between the two companies, Energy Transfer’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is also(opens in new window) the CFO of Sunoco(opens in new window) .

The acquisitions by Sunoco in Europe should therefore be considered as acquisitions by Energy Transfer. This article refers to these purchases as acquisitions by both Energy Transfer and Sunoco.

The Netherlands

Sunoco’s accumulation of energy assets in Europe began with the acquisition(opens in new window) of Zenith Energy Europe in 2024. Zenith owned an oil terminal at Amsterdam port (as well as one in Ireland, more on this below). Amsterdam is the world’s largest petrol port(opens in new window) and a leading player in the global oil market. Its large and flexible tank storage terminals are a key part of its functioning as a hub for trading and mixing gasoline products.

With its purchase of Zenith Energy Europe, Sunoco now owns one of the largest liquid fuel storage terminals(opens in new window) in the port and the largest truck loading facility in Europe. The terminal provides storage for oil and oil-derived products and has the capacity to hold 1.1 million m³. According to Sunoco(opens in new window) , the terminal “occupies a strategic position within the Port of Amsterdam, a pivotal hub for global energy trading and a critical component of Europe’s energy market.”

Ireland

With the 2024 acquisition of Zenith Energy, Sunoco also acquired the Whiddy Island terminal at Bantry Bay in Ireland. This is Ireland’s biggest liquid fuels terminal(opens in new window) with a storage capacity of 1.4 million m³, which, according to Sunoco(opens in new window) , is “supporting the nation’s strategic oil reserves”. The terminal is of critical importance to both Ireland and Europe because of its ability to receive very large crude carriers(opens in new window) and distribute crude oil to major European refining centres. Bantry Bay is only one of two independent (non-state owned) terminals in western Europe that can handle such vessels. Furthermore, the terminal stores a significant portion of the Irish State’s oil reserves(opens in new window) and the National Oil Reserve Agency is one of its largest customers.

Germany

In May 2025, Sunoco agreed to buy (opens in new window) Germany’s largest independent liquid petrochemical storage operator, TanQuid, for €500 million. TanQuid owns and operates 15 fuel terminals in Germany and one in southwestern Poland. The 15 terminals in Germany have a storage capacity of over 3 million m³, around 19% of Germany’s total tank storage capacity(opens in new window) .

Under Germany’s ‘Kritis’ Regulation(opens in new window) , critical infrastructure includes “organisations and facilities of major importance for society whose failure or impairment would cause a sustained shortage of supplies, significant disruptions to public order, safety and security or other dramatic consequences.” TanQuid’s oil terminal network is registered as critical infrastructure(opens in new window) by the German government. According to the government, they “play an indispensable role in the oil supply chain(opens in new window) ”.

As of October 2025, the Sunoco-TanQuid deal is reportedly under review(opens in new window) by the German government and not yet finalised.

Poland

TanQuid operates one terminal in Radzionków, Poland, which is situated at a strategically important transportation point. It is described by the industry as one of the most advanced reloading terminals in Poland(opens in new window) , mainly used by foreign companies and independent operators on the wholesale and retail market.

Further European Expansion Planned

Sunoco has made clear that it plans further investment and expansion in Europe. In a 2024 earnings call, Sunoco’s Chief Operating Officer explained(opens in new window) that the company is building a fuel storage terminal network in Europe because they think this has the potential to become among their most profitable and valuable assets. In addition to buying critical energy infrastructure in Europe through Sunoco, Energy Transfer is developing an LNG export terminal(opens in new window) in the US, which will export LNG to Europe(opens in new window) .

The company has the European market clearly in its sights. But where are the European regulators?

EU foreign investment screening

What Energy Transfer is doing in its acquisition of European assets is termed foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2019, recognising that foreign investors buying up European assets can come with risks for the public, the EU adopted a regulation(opens in new window) to improve the screening of high-risk investments. It specifically asks(opens in new window) member states and the European Commission (EC) to consider the potential impacts of certain foreign investment on:

“(a) critical infrastructure, whether physical or virtual, including energy; …(c) supply of critical inputs, including energy or raw materials…”

Currently, the Directive only encourages member states to adopt national FDI screening mechanisms and share information with each other. In 2024, the EC presented a proposal(opens in new window) to improve the FDI screening framework, which, as of October 2025, is being discussed by the EC, the European Council and the European Parliament. The revised framework will be mandatory for member states and expand the scope of transactions that should be screened.

Under the existing FDI screening regulation, certain investors should request authorisation for their investment. According to a report(opens in new window) published by the European Commission, member states handled a total of 3,136 screening cases in 2024. These include both requests for authorisation, as well as screening cases initiated by the authorities themselves. Of these cases, 41% were formally screened, and 59% did not require formal screening or were declared ineligible. According to the report, only 1% of all investments notified for screening were ultimately blocked by national authorities, and 9% were approved with additional conditions or mitigating measures.

Regulators: asleep at the wheel?

Based on the EU’s regulatory framework, Energy Transfer’s investments in key European energy infrastructure should have been screened by the member states where the acquisition took place. The Netherlands, Germany and Poland all had FDI screening mechanisms in place(opens in new window) at the time that Sunoco acquired (or commenced acquisition of) energy-related infrastructure in their jurisdictions. While Ireland had not yet implemented its FDI screening mechanism at the time of Sunoco’s acquisition of Zenith, it had adopted its FDI screening policy and should have had an oversight role given the strategic nature of the site.

SOMO reached out to the relevant authorities in Ireland, Germany, and the Netherlands to request their comment on whether and how they screened Sunoco’s investments. None of them responded. SOMO could find no evidence that Sunoco’s acquisitions of critical infrastructure in Ireland and the Netherlands attracted any attention from government authorities.

In Germany, however, both parliament and civil society have raised the issue of the TanQuid sale. In July 2025, parliamentarians asked the government, among other things, to answer questions about(opens in new window) “the consequences of a sale to Sunoco – a subsidiary of Energy Transfer, whose founder, Kelcy Warren, is considered a close confidant of US President Donald Trump.” Questions were also asked about whether the sale is subject to an investment review. Citing trade secret(opens in new window) concerns, the government did not give a substantive response. According to the German non-profit, Frag den Staat, the government did state(opens in new window) that an investment inspection procedure is underway regarding the TanQuid acquisition. The organisation has filed a legal case with the Berlin Administrative Court to obtain more information.

The fact that the German parliament and authorities have given some attention to the TanQuid sale to Energy Transfer raises questions about why Ireland and the Netherlands apparently failed to do so, or at least have been unwilling to provide any public comment on the issue. Moreover, under the EU FDI screening regulation, member states should share information, and when a company has a clear intention to acquire energy infrastructure across the region, such information sharing is vital to the overall ability of the EU and its member states to assess the potential risks of investment.

Conclusion

SOMO is calling for greater scrutiny of Energy Transfer and Sunoco’s investment activity in Europe. Given its poor environmental track record, hostility towards activists, and its apparent willingness to leverage political influence, SOMO questions whether Energy Transfer’s acquisition of critical energy infrastructure in Europe is in the public interest.

European regulators appear to be asleep at the wheel. Only in Germany – as a result of civil society and parliament activity – has there been any significant public scrutiny of Energy Transfer’s investments.

The EU’s FDI screening policy should be expanded to consider the social and environmental risks attached to certain companies, and the potential of investors to drive a self-serving policy agenda on climate and energy. EU member states must be particularly vigilant with investors from the US, given the current administration’s political agenda.

Energy Transfer and Sunoco did not respond to a request for comment on the findings in this article.