This section assesses the independent accountability mechanism of the World Bank (WB), the Inspection Panel (IP). It uses a standardised assessment framework, based on the UNGPs, which is available in Annex 2. This assessment framework clarifies how each of the UNGP criteria was operationalised for the purpose of assessing individual mechanisms. The IP assessment was conducted using the following sources: information made publicly available through the WB and IP’s websites; the IP’s Operational Procedures (OPs); the WB’s safeguard policies; and input from four CSO representatives who have supported and/or filed complaints with the IP, elicited by means of an online survey (see Annex 3).

The Inspection Panel of the World Bank became operational in 1993 and provides a compliance review function. The Inspection Panel consists of three members and has a permanent secretariat that provides operational and administrative support. The Panel may hire independent experts to ensure objective and professional assessment of the issues under review. The Panel’s Operating Procedures were most recently updated in April 2014.

The World Bank Inspection Panel was the first accountability mechanism of its kind for development finance institutions and in its early years, the Panel set the standard for grievance redress and accountability. Over the years, the Panel has played a fundamental role in improving accountability at the Bank and securing a degree of redress in some cases. The Panel has a positive record on conducting outreach events, making itself available to provide information to project-affected people and taking the role of complainants’ representatives seriously. However, some 20 years after the Panel was first established, some users express distrust in the Panel’s ability to handle complaints fairly and impartially, mainly due to a series of decisions made over the past few years.

Compared to newer mechanisms, the Panel’s mandate and functions are limited by the Resolution that established it, restricting it to compliance review, prohibiting it from releasing its draft reports to complainants at the same time they are submitted to the Bank, and preventing it from formally monitoring the implementation of management action plans. The Panel’s pilot application of the ‘Early Solutions approach’ in Lagos State, Nigeria, arguably blocked access to the Panel’s full process for aggrieved project-affected people, two or more of whom requested that their complaint be registered and investigated. It is feared that this case will serve as a precedent for denying recourse to future complainants.

Although there are some notable exceptions, the World Bank’s role in securing accountability and redress is often tarnished by what many civil society organisations experience as a culture of defensiveness in response to complaints and compliance investigations. Accountability is also weakened by poor-quality consultations with complainants on action plans, which make it less likely that action plans will effectively address harms and policy non-compliance. The Bank does not have a policy of ensuring its operations do not cause, contribute to or exacerbate human rights violations. Its full suite of social and environmental safeguard policies do not apply to a considerable proportion of its portfolio, having the effect of blocking access to the Inspection Panel for

### Key Findings and Recommendations
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### Table 1: IP/WB Case Attrition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Completed Cases</th>
<th>Found Eligible</th>
<th>Reached Substantive Phase</th>
<th>Achieved Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: IP/WB Performance Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Research Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases Filed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Closed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Achieving Results</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
people that suffer adverse impacts in connection with these investments. Table 3 contains the recommendations derived from the UNGP assessment that follows. The recommendations describe the reforms needed to the policy and practice of each actor, the IAM and the DFI. It should be noted, however, that the power to implement some of these recommendations regarding the IAM rests with the DFI’s Board of Directors.

### TABLE 3: RECOMMENDATIONS DERIVED FROM UNGP ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>WB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **LEGITIMACY** | • Strengthen the Executive Secretary’s perceived impartiality through a prohibition on future employment at the Bank.  
• Establish a permanent external advisory group to provide guidance and feedback on the Panel’s activities. | • Improve the selection process of Panel members by involving external stakeholders, including civil society representatives. |
| **ACCESSIBILITY** | • Expand accessibility by allowing complaints throughout the life of a project and after closure.  
• Shift the ‘plausible link’ assessment from the pre-registration stage to the eligibility assessment stage.  
• Replace the Early Solutions approach with an approach that provides procedural safeguards for complainants, including the registration of their complaint and expert facilitation of a dispute resolution process. | • Amend the description of the Grievance Redress Service (GRS) to ensure that it is clear that it is not an independent accountability mechanism and that its mandate and function are significantly different from the mandate and function of the Inspection Panel.  
• Require clients to disclose availability of the Inspection Panel to project-affected people. |
| **PREDICTABILITY** | • Increase adherence deadlines and provide clear reasons to complainants when the decision is made to depart from standard procedures or when deadlines cannot be met.  
• Provide complainants with regular updates on the status of their cases.  
• Expand mandate to allow the inclusion of recommendations in investigation reports and the monitoring of implementation of the action plan. | • Develop effective Management Action Plans that respond to every finding of non-compliance made by the Panel.  
• Set deadlines for Board consideration of the Panel’s recommendation for investigation and final investigation report together with Management’s proposed action plan. |

| **EQUITABILITY** | • Disclose draft investigation report to complainants for comment.  
• Disclose final report to the complainants at the same time that it is sent to the Board. |
| **TRANSPARENCY** | • Further improve the systematic public disclosure of information about cases on the website. |
| **RIGHTS COMPLIANCE** | • Expand mandate to allow recommendations for project/disbursement suspension to prevent human rights violations and other harms.  
• Adopt protocols to protect the security of complainants, local contractors and those interviewed in the course of its investigations. |
| **LESSONS LEARNED** | • Standardise the process for review of the Operating Procedures, without requiring the agreement of Bank Management or Board.  
• Institute a regular process to learn from previous cases and experience. |

- Disclose project information in languages spoken by project-affected people.  
- Report annually on the percentage of the Bank’s portfolio that does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Panel.  
- Commit not to fund activities that could cause, contribute to or exacerbate human rights violations.  
- Require assessment of the human rights impacts of the activities it finances.  
- Design and implement action plans that fully and effectively remedy human rights violations and other harms suffered and prevent future violations and harms.  
- Adopt measures to protect affected communities from reprisals when they raise concerns about Bank-financed activities.  
- Institute a formal and regular process to learn from Inspection Panel findings of non-compliance and report on changes made to policy/practice as a result.  
- Commit not to provide additional financing for similar activities to clients found to be in non-compliance until the non-compliance has been remedied.
LEGITIMACY

IAM: The World Bank Inspection Panel’s new operating procedures underscore that “the Panel is independent from Bank Management and reports directly to the Board, and conducts its work impartially.” However, users expressed distrust in the Panel’s ability to handle complaints fairly. The mechanism’s independence has deteriorated in recent years. Former Bank staff can be hired as Panel members, but a two-year “cooling off” period is required. Though Panel members cannot be employed by the Bank after their term expires, the Executive Secretary’s Terms of Reference were recently amended to allow him/her to be hired by the Bank, but only by the other four independent WBG offices. These amendments also imposed renewable five-year fixed term limits for the Executive Secretary – previously a permanent position. In response to these changes, former Panel members sent a letter to the Inspection Panel, raising concerns regarding impartiality of the office.

DFI: The World Bank President nominates Panel members in consultation with the Executive Directors, who are then responsible for appointing the Panel. External stakeholders are not involved in the process. According to the resolution establishing the Panel, members should be “selected on the basis of their ability to deal thoroughly and fairly with the requests brought to them, their integrity, their independence from the Bank Management, and their exposure to developmental issues and to living conditions in developing countries.” The profiles of recent panel members have been similar, having previously worked at large international development institutions.

ACCESSIBILITY

IAM: The Panel organises outreach events and meetings, and takes part in civil society events to raise awareness of its existence. The Inspection Panel’s website offers information on the mechanism’s scope and mandate, complaint admissibility, information that must be included in a complaint, how to file a complaint, and a suggested format for doing so. Its brochure is available in 11 languages, and complaints may be submitted in the complainant’s local language. Beyond formal criteria for accessing the mechanism, according to users’ experience, the Inspection Panel is generally available via email or phone prior to submitting a complaint and during the process, and will normally respond to requests for meetings promptly.

However, the Panel’s mandate restricts access in several ways. Complaints cannot be filed by an individual, but rather only be filed by a group of two or more people (or an appointed representative of the group). Complaints cannot be submitted after 95% of the committed financing has been disbursed, even though harms may only be felt after the project has already closed, and it may be difficult for the complainant to discover the status of disbursement. Complainants must have first attempted to resolve the matter with Bank Management directly and the Bank must have had “reasonable opportunity to respond”. Under the 2014 operating procedures (OPs), the Panel can refuse to register a complaint if it determines through an initial screening that there is no plausible link between the project or programme and the alleged harm. Given the complexities in defining the scope of some projects, and in understating their environmental and social impacts, it may not be immediately obvious that a plausible link exists. This should not provide an obstacle to registration and instead, the plausibility of a link should be determined during the more thorough eligibility assessment. (Where there is plainly no link whatsoever to a Bank-financed project, the compliant could be disqualified from registration as ‘trivial’ under the OPs.)

The Early Solutions approach, currently being piloted in a series of cases, in effect limits access to the Inspection Panel because when the approach is triggered, the complaint is not registered. The new operating procedures “recognize the right of Requesters at any time to indicate that they are not satisfied and would like the Panel to register their Request.” However, in the first case in which the approach was piloted, at least two of the complainants expressed dissatisfaction and asked the Panel to register the Request for Inspection, but the Panel refused to do so. This decision, seemingly at odds with the Board Resolution establishing the Panel, denied legitimate complainants access to the Panel’s standard procedures.

DFI: Accessibility to the Inspection Panel for people adversely affected by World Bank operations is vastly impeded by the proliferation of lending instruments and technical assistance modalities to which the full set of safeguard policies do not apply. The World Bank recently made it easier to locate the Inspection Panel on its website. Although still not prominent, “World Bank Group Accountability” is now included in the list of links at the bottom of the homepage, with links to all of the mechanisms, including the Inspection Panel. A different series of links, however, brings you to the Bank’s new Grievance Redress Service (GRS), which is located within and operated by Bank Management. The first sentence on the page states that the GRS is the World Bank’s complaints mechanism. The GRS webpages provide a description of eligibility requirements for submitting complaints and a review process. The final questions on the Frequently Asked Questions tab explains that there is no formal relationship between the GRS and the Inspection Panel and that the use of the GRS does not restrict access to the Panel. However, the establishment of the GRS and its presentation is likely to cause confusion about the role of the Inspection Panel as compared to the GRS, and could be viewed as an attempt by Bank Management to divert aggrieved persons away from the Inspection Panel and the more independent accountability process that it provides. A reference to the Inspection Panel was recently included in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for Bank-financed projects. Although available online, it is unclear whether the PAD is translated into local languages and actively distributed to project-affected communities. The Bank does not otherwise require borrowers to disclose the Inspection Panel’s availability, nor does it provide technical assistance to those who face barriers to access.
Predictability

IAM: Predictability of the process has decreased over time. In general, there are clear procedures and deadlines for responding to complaints. However, respondents noted unanticipated delays at various stages as hindering predictability of the Inspection Panel process. Furthermore, several years ago the Panel began a practice of deferring its decision on whether to register complaints and its recommendations on eligibility in certain cases in an attempt to give Management more time to address the grievances, thereby avoiding a compliance investigation. This practice is referred to in footnote 7 of the OPs, which may be a partial attempt to legitimise the process. The adoption of formal procedures for the Early Solutions approach, which defers registration to allow Management an additional opportunity to address the complainants’ grievances, could conceivably increase predictability around this practice. However, in one of the pilot cases, deadlines were not met and the decision by the Panel not to register the complaint despite a request to do so by some complainants who were told earlier that such a request would be honoured, does not bode well for the predictability of this process. In one recent case from Ethiopia, the Panel failed to interview requesters during its investigation, which was a substantive deviation from the expected due process. The absence of a mandate to monitor its findings of non-compliance also undermines the predictability of the process.

DFI: There are no deadlines in the Panel’s operating procedures for Board consideration of the Panel’s recommendation for investigation, nor the Board’s decision regarding Management’s proposed action plan prepared in response to the Panel’s investigation report. Management’s engagement in the complaint process is governed by Bank Procedure, which largely reflects the deadlines included in the Panel’s procedures, with the addition of restrictions regarding communicating with the Board, complainants, and the media. The Panel’s procedures require that complainants first raise their concerns with Bank Management. For complainants who do not know who to contact or who cannot access the resident mission, the recent creation of the GRS may make this procedure for the Early Solutions approach, which defers registration to allow Management an additional opportunity to address the complainants’ grievances, could conceivably increase predictability around this practice. However, as stated above, the GRS could also generate confusion and divert complainants from the Panel.

Equitability

IAM: The Inspection Panel’s constrained mandate results in an inequitable process in policy and practice. While the Panel normally consults with complainants during the investigation process, unlike at other IAMs, neither the complainants nor Management have an opportunity to review draft investigation reports prior to their finalisation. Furthermore, complainants do not have access to the Panel’s final investigation report prior to their consultation with Bank Management on the Action Plan. Both the Panel’s Recommendation Report (regarding eligibility of the complaint) and the Investigation Report are only disclosed after Board approval. Thus, the Board does not have the benefit of the complainants’ perspectives on the Investigation Report and Management’s response and Action Plan when it considers them. In their review comments to a draft of this report, the Panel indicated that they are in the process of proposing a possible solution to this issue.

DFI: Complainants do not have access to the Panel’s investigation report, nor Management’s response at the time they are consulted by Management on the action plan, and thus enter the discussion without critical information that is available to the Bank and the Borrower. Users have found the consultation process for the action plan to be entirely inadequate: one respondent noted that consultation took place two days before the action plan deadline, while another described the consultation as a “charade”. Management must communicate the nature and outcome of the consultation process to the Panel. The Panel may, at its discretion, submit a report to the Board on the adequacy of the consultation for the Board’s consideration in determining whether or not to approve the report and action plan. The resolution establishing the mechanism states that the Panel “shall be given budgetary resources as shall be sufficient to carry out its activities”. The US$43,025 budget surplus for 2013-2014 suggests that the Panel receives adequate funding.

Transparency

IAM: Documents for Inspection Panel cases are not consistently available online. As of 2 June 2015, the complaint was missing for six of the last ten complaints filed, and two of the six lacked any documentation whatsoever, although this may be at the complainant’s request. Following the review period, on 8 November 2015, the complaints were still missing from three of those cases, and an additional case had no documentation whatsoever. All documents were available for the remaining six cases. According to the Panel, missing files may be due to the Panel’s disclosure regime, which allows for complaints to be made publicly available only after a notice of non-registration or an eligibility report is posted, and not before. For five of the ten most recent cases, documents were available in English as well as in a second language. The Panel provides detailed reasons for its recommendation on eligibility and its conclusions in its investigation reports, although the quality of the reasoning varies, with a recent deterioration in quality of investigations noted by users. The information required for this report was generally easy to locate, with two exceptions: information on independent expert consultants retained by the Secretariat could not be found, nor could details on scheduled reviews of the Mechanism.

DFI: Users had different views on the availability of information on the World Bank website, with some noting that it did not provide sufficient information to make use of the Mechanism. According to the Bank’s Access to Information Policy, the Bank “routinely discloses a wide range of documents […] as soon as the documents are finalized after key process milestones”. Prior to publishing, however, the Bank may “adjust” documents to
address the borrower/country’s concerns. The policy is fairly vague and does not establish deadlines for disclosure. Under the Policy on Environmental Assessment, borrowers are required to provide relevant material in an understandable and accessible form and in a timely manner to inform meaningful consultations. For example, for the initial consultation for Category A projects, the borrower must provide a summary of the project and its potential impacts and must make the draft Environmental Assessment report available in a public place accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs. Some CSOs have complained, however, that project information is not available in a language accessible for project-affected people.

**RIGHTS COMPATIBILITY**

**IAM:** The Inspection Panel does not have the explicit authority to receive complaints alleging violations of human rights by World Bank projects, although it has considered complaints regarding social impacts that amount to human rights violations, such as forced evictions, in many of its cases. In one recent case relating to a project in Ethiopia, the Panel refused to consider allegations of serious human rights abuses, stating that such an investigation “would exceed its mandate.” Even when the Panel conducts an investigation that considers human rights issues, its conclusions are not binding on the Bank, and it does not have the power to make recommendations to remedy harms or to monitor the implementation of the Management’s action plan.

The Panel’s mandate also limits its ability to prevent human rights abuses, as the mechanism does not have the power to recommend project suspension when a project threatens complainants with imminent harm. Complaints may be submitted confidentially and complainants’ identities can be kept anonymous throughout the process. Nonetheless, there have been instances of retaliation against those involved in the complaint process. In its review comments to a draft of this report, the Panel has indicated that it is in the process of developing guidelines on reprisals, a draft of which will be shared with CSOs before being adopted.

**DFI:** Human rights are mentioned in the Bank’s policies only with regard to indigenous peoples. In a recent report to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights concluded that, “the existing approach taken by the [World] Bank to human rights is incoherent, counterproductive and unsustainable. For most purposes, the World Bank is a human rights-free zone. In its operational policies, in particular, it treats human rights more like an infectious disease than universal values and obligations.” The World Bank does not have a policy requirement to remediate harms, including human rights violations, to which it contributes. According to users, Management action plans rarely provide rights-compatible remedies for harms caused by World Bank-financed projects.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

**IAM:** The Inspection Panel publishes annual reports, which typically identify systemic issues and lessons learned. This discussion was, however, absent from the 2013-2014 Annual Report. In their review comments, the Panel indicated that it is in the process of documenting some of the lessons that have emerged from its cases over the years. The resulting reports will go through a peer review process, including CSOs.

While there was an opportunity to provide feedback on the Panel’s draft operating procedures when they were reviewed in 2014, CSO members felt that their views were not meaningfully taken into account. There is no indication that mechanism reviews take place on a regular basis. The evaluation of the Pilot Early Solutions approach, initially scheduled for the end of 2015, has been postponed until after a third complaint has been handled according to the Pilot procedures.

**DFI:** Panel cases do not necessarily entail follow-up: instead, Management may propose to the Board the need for follow-up reports on the implementation of remedial efforts and/or the action plan. Users noted that the Bank often fails to improve its policies and/or practices in response to cases, indicating that despite occasionally identifying trends, Management does not take actions to prevent problems from recurring.

**ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS CLOSED WITHOUT REACHING A SUBSTANTIVE PHASE**

According to the Inspection Panel’s website, between 1 July 2014 and 30 June 2015, there were ten Requests for Inspection (complaints) that were closed without reaching a substantive phase of the complaint process. These closed cases include those that were: (1) deemed ineligible for registration; (2) otherwise not registered because the complaint was diverted to the “Piloting a new approach to support early solutions in the Inspection Panel Process” (the “Pilot Program”); or (3) registered but not recommended for investigation.

Three of the complaints were closed without reaching a substantive phase on the grounds that they fell outside the Mechanism’s mandate. In one case, the activity giving rise to the complaint was not part of a World Bank-financed project. In another case, the Panel determined that the complainant failed to comply with a procedural requirement, rendering the complaint ineligible for review. In the third case, the Panel determined that the subject of the complaint fell outside of its substantive jurisdiction because the complaint concerned a Bank-financed activity that is subject to the Bank’s Administrative Manual, rather than its operational policies and procedures, and the Panel is limited to investigating alleged violations of the Bank’s operational policies and procedures (see Box 2 of main report). None of these three complaints was registered by the Panel.
The Panel closed another complaint before it reached any substantive phase, citing parallel proceedings. The Panel concluded that a then-ongoing domestic court proceeding would determine whether the project in question would be implemented, and therefore an investigation by the Panel was premature. This complaint was not registered.

Three other complaints were closed because the Panel found there was an insufficient causal link between the harm alleged and Bank-financed activities. One of these complaints, “Armenia: Second Education Quality and Relevance Project, Education Improvement Project”, was registered but the Panel did not recommend investigation because it concluded that the complainants’ concerns pointed to systemic weaknesses in the Armenian education system, which the Panel did not consider to be the result of the Bank’s project. Moreover, the Panel reasoned that an investigation of the issues raised by the complainants would amount to an evaluation of the results of the country’s education sector reform that would exceed the Panel’s role and mandate. The other two complaints closed due to the same reason (insufficient causal link), “India: Second Tamil Nadu Road Sector Project (Proposed)” and “Tajikistan/Kyrgyz Republic/Afghanistan/Pakistan: Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000)” were not registered. In the Tamil Nadu project, the Panel determined that the Bank was not presently financing the specific road works that were the subject of the complaint, though the concerns generally related to the Bank’s infrastructure project. In the other, the Panel noted that the complainants did not reside in the countries where the project is located, and concluded that there was no discernable link between the project and the concerns they raised.

The three remaining complaints closed within the research period without reaching a substantive phase of the complaint process were determined by the Panel to have been resolved by the DFI outside the IAM process. In the Panel’s view, the harms complained of had been addressed either through consultation with WB Management or via the Pilot Program and therefore investigation was not warranted. One of these complaints, regarding the Uzbekistan “Second Rural Enterprise Support Project”, was registered but the Panel did not recommend further investigation because it determined that the issues presented by the complainants were resolved through consultation with and steps taken by Management (see Box 3 in the main report). The other two complaints, regarding the Paraguay “Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development Project” and the “Lagos Metropolitan Development and Government Project” in Nigeria were deemed to have been resolved through the Pilot Program.

NOTES
1 This number may differ from the ‘total concluded cases’ in the previous table, because it includes all cases filed, including cases that are currently active and have not yet closed or entered monitoring.
2 This row includes cases that were not registered, were found ineligible or were closed after being found eligible, but before reaching a substantive phase.
5 The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), Internal Audit, and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman.
9 Operating Procedures, supra note 4, at ¶ 25.
11 Operating Procedures, supra note 4, at Annex I, ¶ 5(b).
16 Operating Procedures, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 26, 33, 36, 37, 64.
19 Operating Procedures, supra note 4, at ¶ 76, 72.
20 1999 Clarification of the Board, supra note 10, at ¶ 15: Operating Procedures, supra note 4, at ¶ 70.
21 BP ¶ 55, supra note 16, at fn. 25: Operating Procedures, supra note 4, at ¶ 70.
22 Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel, supra note 7, ¶ 11.
26 Inspection Panel comments to draft report, received 22 October 2015.
29 World Bank Inspection Panel, Panel Cases, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Panel_Cases.aspx. When the Panel receives a Request for Inspection from a Requester, it verifies technical eligibility criteria required for Registration. Additional information may be requested by the Panel in order to make this determination. The panel may “Register” the request or, if the Panel determines that one or more criteria have not been met, issue a “Notice of Non-Registration.” If the request is “Registered,” Bank Management (as distinct from the Board of Executive Directors [the “Board”]) must respond to the request. Following receipt of this Management Response, the Panel must decide whether to recommend investigation to the Board, which retains ultimate authority to approve an investigation. See Operating Procedures, supra note 3. As of 2014, there is also an alternative “pilot approach” designed to provide an early opportunity for Bank Management and requesters to address concerns raised in a particular Request for Inspection without investigation, by postponing the Panel’s decision on Registration. See Pilot approach, a new tool for supporting early solutions in the Inspection Panel process (Nov. 6, 2013), http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/PilotApproachNew.pdf.
31 Inspection Panel, Project Name: Kazakhstan-South West Roads: Western Europe-Western China International Transit Corridor – CAREC-1B & 6B (2010) (Third Request), http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=101. Specifically, the Panel found the complaint ineligibl because it was submitted by a single individual, and concerned a local judicial decision.
36 Inspection Panel, Project Name: Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (PI09126) and Additional Financing for the Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (PI26962), http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=92. For further information on this complaint, see Box 3 in this report.
37 Inspection Panel, Project Name: Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (PI09126) and Additional Financing for the Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (PI26962), http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=92. For further information on this complaint, see Box 3 in this report.
38 Inspection Panel, Project Names: Paraguay: Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development Project, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=92. For further information on this complaint, see Box 3 in this report.
39 Inspection Panel, Project Name: Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (PI09126) and Additional Financing for the Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (PI26962), http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=92. For further information on this complaint, see Box 3 in this report.